The evolution of the German concepts of military cooperation in Europe

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Abstract
Germany’s military cooperation with European partners is undertaken either within the European Union or outside its structures. The cooperation within the European Union takes place mainly on two levels: inter-governmental and supranational. The cooperation outside the EU is also focused on two levels: bilateral and multilateral. The author’s intention is to identify the direction of the evolution of the German concepts of military cooperation in Europe during the reign of Angela Merkel using a multi-level approach.

Concepts co-created or co-implemented by Germany assume that strong and united Europe can counteract external threats by development of its own military component. It is clear, that there is conceptual asymmetry, that is why there are more intergovernmental concepts (military missions, PESCO, strengthened CSDP, Eliza) than transnational concepts, from which we distinguish the only one, e.g. the concept of the European army. The influence on the evolution of the German concepts can have an integral federalism, which this country adheres to, and which was implemented after the Second World War into the political and administrative system, i.e. system based on multilevelness and cooperation of authorities, that has proved effective, so it can also be effective in multi-level military cooperation in the EU.

Keywords: Germany, military cooperation, Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), European Union, the European army

Ewolucja niemieckich koncepcji współpracy wojskowej w Europie

Streszczenie
Germany’s military cooperation with European partners is undertaken either within the European Union or outside its structures. On the one hand, cooperation within the European Union takes place primarily at two levels: intergovernmental and supranational. On the other hand, cooperation outside the EU is also focused on two levels: bilateral and multilateral. This multi-level stratification of military cooperation in Europe (two-tier within the EU and two-tier outside the EU) can also be referred to its conceptual approach, i.e. attempts to examine the direction of the evolution of German proposals regarding more or less institutionalised European military connections (Ruszkowski 2013).

The author hypothesises that German concepts of military cooperation have evolved in two ways: the first one was from the intergovernmental military cooperation to the supranational, and the second one – from the outside the institutional and legal system to the cooperation in the institutional and legal system of the EU.

The author also asks the following research questions: What does military cooperation look like as part of sectoral policies, can it bring defense benefits? How does the external environment influence the evolution of the concept of military cooperation? Why do Germany and France want closer military cooperation? Will the European army compete with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)? How will the development of the military component strengthen the EU’s defense power?

First of all, the author’s intention is to identify the direction of evolution using a multi-level approach, which will further emphasise the scope of the impact of these concepts and help organise them. The selection of the research sample was dependent on two criteria. The first one is chronological and it relates to the evolution of aforementioned concepts under Chancellorship of Angela Merkel, i.e. in the years 2005–2018. That is why the author does not discuss the concept of the European Battle Groups or the European Rapid Reaction Force, as they were created earlier, in the 1990s. The second criterion is related to the role played by the Federal Republic of Germany. The concepts that have been proposed only by Germany (in this case, this country is the sole author of the initiative) or by the other EU countries, but in cooperation with Germany (in this case Germany is a co-author of the initiative) will be analysed.
For the above mentioned reasons, the main approach in the research will be the Multi-level Approach (MLA), which consists of several varieties (e.g. Multi-level Governance, Multi-level Membership, Multi-level Europeanisation). The MLA concept was created from a critique of intergovernmentalism. The intergovernmentalism underlines the leading role of the nation-state in integration processes and argues that such a state is a major player in the European Union. The development of the intergovernmental approach is liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), which indicates the main role of states in the process of European integration (Moravscik 1993: p.480).

The intergovernmental approach does not fully reflect the dynamics of the integration process, especially after the Maastricht Treaty. Contemporary interactions within the EU take place simultaneously on and between many levels. Thus, the multi-level nature of the EU political system can be seen. At the beginning of the 1990s, in the framework of European studies were created the foundations of a multi-level approach, then in a variety of Multi-level Governance (MLG) (Marks 1993: p.391–410), which is a specialised analytical approach (Borkowski 2007: p.162–163; Ruszkowski 2013: p.7). Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, considered the main initiators of multi-level governance, described it as dispersion of power at many levels of political order (Hooghe, Marks 2001: p. 28). At the same time, they prove that in the last fifty years power and sovereignty in Europe have gone from national governments not only to the supranational level of the EU, but also to the level of lower regional unions or local authorities.

According to Luiza Wojnicz, the process of the European integration has resulted in a political configuration characterised by the decentralised policy structure, in which several entities are involved in various fields, and the area of foreign policy, security and defense is no exception to this rule. The evolution of the Common Foreign Policy (CFP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) demonstrates the growing synergy between the national, international and supranational levels, within which a wide range of entities cooperate (Wojnicz 2013: p. 220).

Gary Marx defines multi-level governance as a system of permanent negotiations between governments at several territorial levels, which is the result of a wider institution-building process and reallocation of decision-making, consisting in shifting previously centralised functions “up” to a supranational level, and others “down” – to the regional level (Marks 1993: p.407). It can be assumed that MLG is a multi-level management system, in which there is a combination of supranational, intergovernmental, national and subnational institutions and a certain degree of centralisation and decentralisation. The author distinguished five groups of MLG typologies: MLG development concept, MLG trajectory, sectoral MLG, participatory MLG, systemic MLG (Żurek 2013: p. 92). It seems that the participatory MLG type will be particularly useful for considering the German concepts of European military cooperation in Europe.

**German concepts of military cooperation within the EU**

In accordance with the adopted stratification of multi-level governance, the analysis of the evolution of the German concepts of military cooperation in Europe was based on
two levels: intergovernmental and supranational, with priority detailing the concepts that Germany was a co-author.

**Intergovernmental concepts**

**a). The concept of the reinforced Common Security and Defense Policy**

On September 26–27, 2016, before the meeting of the EU defense ministers in Bratislava, the heads of these ministries from Germany and France – Ursula von der Leyen and Jean-Yves Le Drian – presented a document entitled “Revitalizing CSDP. Towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible defence in the EU” (germ.: Erneuerung der GSVP. Hinzu einer umfassenden, realistischen und glaubwürdigen Verteidigung in der EU). These proposals from Germany were based on the *White Paper 2016 on the security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr* (germ.: *Weißbuch 2016 – zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*). It emphasised that the integration of the armed forces in Europe takes place within the EU and NATO and is very advanced in many areas, decades of practice and cooperation in many EU–NATO joint operations contribute to this. Germany has made as its long-term goal the pursuit of a common European security and defense union, which it wanted to achieve through the consistent implementation of the European Council’s mandates for the gradual, concrete further development of the CSDP; making use of all the possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty, such as permanent structured cooperation; compact and diverse bilateral and multilateral defense and military policy.

According to the aforementioned *White Paper 2016* (germ.: *Weißbuch 2016*), three main areas of CSDP development should be worked out, such as: further development of its structures, integration of civil and military capabilities and strengthening of the European defense industry (*Weissbuch 2016*: p.73)

The German-French initiative presented proposals for strengthening the CSDP, as well as increasing the operational efficiency of the CSDP, developing joint military capabilities, especially by revitalising the concept of the EU Battle Groups, conducting research and development in the European defense sector and within European Defense Agency (EDA). The Ministers drew attention to the development of multilateral organisational cooperation and the establishment of a permanent EU military staff with the possibility of operational planning in the short and medium term (*Erneuerung der GSVP*... 2016)

It is a co-author concept of Germany and France of an intergovernmental nature, located in the sphere of the EU sectoral policies.

**b). European Security Council concept**

In response to the new strategy of Federica Mogherini, which was entitled “Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy”, as well as the outcome of the referendum in Great Britain, the French and German foreign ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-Marc Ayrault presented a proposal to strengthen the CSDP: “A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties 2016”. In a nine-page document, they supported activities aimed at implementing the new European strategy and announced that they would promote an integrated EU
foreign and security policy, combining all EU policy instruments. To implement these efforts, France and Germany propose that the European Council meet once a year as the European Security Council to address EU internal and external security and defense issues. This council should be prepared at the meeting of ministers of three ministries: foreign affairs, defense and home affairs (A strong Europe... 2016: p. 5). Ministers pointed out that the EU must take more action to manage crises that directly affect its security, and therefore the EU needs stronger and more flexible tools for crisis prevention and management. The EU should be able to plan and conduct more effective civilian and military operations, with the support of a permanent civilian-military command structure. It should rely on high preparedness forces and ensure joint financing of its operations. If necessary, EU Member States should consider establishing a permanent naval force or acquiring combat capabilities within the EU in the other key areas (A strong Europe... 2016: p. 4). The establishment of the European Security Council was supported by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel during her speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in November 2018. The new Council would have a rotating presidency that would help to improve the European defense and security policy (Dempsey 2018). Whether it would look as initially presented by the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany in 2016, it is not yet known. Chancellor Merkel in the interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) said that “she can imagine the European Security Council, which consists of some EU countries” (Europa muss... 2018). That means, not all the countries will participate in its work, but only those that express such a desire. The number of the Council members will be changed. The benefit of the establishment of the European Security Council will be faster action, close cooperation with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and European members of the UN Security Council (Europa muss... 2018). The German side is quite serious thinks about the new formula of the CSDP meetings. The new body, the European Security Council, would allow more effective security operations both at the EU forum and with other international organisations. The initiative to create the European Security Council is a co-author concept of Germany and France, it is intergovernmental and is located in the institutional sphere.

c). The concept of using the Bundeswehr in the EU military operations

Germany was already a member of the international military structure – NATO at the time when the county began creating the EU defense policy, and, eventually, also the EU army. Moreover, the country’s activity in the area of military cooperation is determined constitutionally. There is a restriction that does not allow the Bundeswehr to carry out operations outside Germany, except situations where the Bundestag has given its consent. Article 87a of the Basic Law concerns the armed forces that the state creates for defense and not for another purpose. Article 87a (2) states: “Armed forces may be used outside of defense only if the Basic Law expressly allows this” (Ustawa zasadnicza... 2007: p. 201).

However, with the adaptation of NATO, the European Union and the United Nations to the changing world at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the tasks of the Member
States, including Germany, have also increased. This fact had far-reaching consequences for the German armed forces, what was described in the defense policy guidelines (germ.: Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien) of 2003, as well as in the concept of the Bundeswehr (germ.: Konzeption der Bundeswehr) in 2004. This is the concept of the transition of the German armed forces from the only defensive army to the army participating in the missions. This process was carried out consistently, therefore, the Bundeswehr undergoes great changes (Weissbuch... 2006: p.18).

Since then, the German armed forces have been increasingly involved in military missions under both the UN and the EU flags. It was important to consistently adaption of the new Bundeswehr course to the new spectrum of tasks. In general, it has gained better opportunities to participate in multinational operations (Konzeption der Bundeswehr 2004: p.7). Currently Germany is involved in 12 missions, including three in the framework of the EU multilateral cooperation (see Table 1). In addition, Germany has participated in already completed EU missions, such as:

- **EUSEC RD Congo** – EU advisory and support mission for the reform of the security sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This mission supported the reform of the Congolese army and the creation of multi-ethnic integrated brigades since 2005 at the formal request of the Congolese interim government.

- **EUCAP NESTOR EU** – the mission to restore maritime potential in the Horn of Africa region.


### Table 1. Bundeswehr participation in the EU military missions (as of December 7, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>First mandate</th>
<th>Actual mandate from</th>
<th>Termination of the mandate</th>
<th>Amount of mandates</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR MED</td>
<td>Operation Sophia</td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>01.10.2015</td>
<td>14.06.2018</td>
<td>30.06.2019</td>
<td>950</td>
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Germany has increased its involvement and participation in military missions. The Bundeswehr participates in preventive actions in crisis situations, with time-limited high-intensity operations, but also in long-term stabilisation operations. It has only a multilateral dimension. The basis of action is strong integration with allied structures, the
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use of multinational connections and the promotion of common values and interests. The priority for Germany is the close, gradual integration of European armed forces, the strengthening of the European pillar in NATO and more coherent cooperation between NATO and the EU (Konzeption der Bundeswehr 2004: p. 9).

d). Germany and the PESCO concept

On November 13, 2017, the ministers of 23 EU Member States, including Germany, signed a joint notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and forwarded it to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the Council. Formally, structured cooperation in the field of defense was concluded on December 14, 2017 at the Brussels Summit. 25 countries have already declared their accession to the joint defense initiative (excluding Great Britain, Denmark and Malta).

Joint notification, which is a formal step towards establishing PESCO, sets out the principles of cooperation, underlining in particular that “PESCO is an ambitious, binding and inclusive legal framework for investing in the security and defense of the territory and the EU citizens” (Defense Cooperation 2017). A list of ambitious and shared commitments that Member States agreed to undertake, included the commitment to “systematically increase of the real defense budgets to achieve the agreed targets” and “PESCO management proposals, providing for the introduction of a senior level that will maintain the consistency and ambition of PESCO’s objectives and be complemented by specific project-level management procedures” (Defense Cooperation... 2017). It was emphasised that PESCO is not an independent instrument, but it was designed for complementation of other instruments. For example, the European Defense Fund proposed by the European Commission in November 2016 will support some projects financially, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) – Member States’ efforts to better present the possibilities of new cooperation initiatives (in particular PESCO projects).

At the Munich Security Conference on February 16, 2018, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen said that PESCO is an example of a Europe, which (in the face of global challenges such as terrorism, poverty and climate change) must finally start make decisions faster. Those who are willing must be able to move forward – not blocked by other individual nations, just as in the field of defense this has already been achieved thanks to PESCO (Speech by Federal Minister... 2018).

From the beginning, the German government supported the work leading to notification of PESCO. At its 165th meeting on October 18, 2017, the federal government dealt with key points regarding German participation in permanent structured cooperation. Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and Foreign Affairs Minister Sigmar Gabriel have prepared a joint report on the subject. According to this report, according to Berlin, PESCO’s goal is to fill gaps in key capabilities, increase the capacity of the European Union to conduct crisis management operations on its own, and coordinate and more efficient engagement of resources in the area of security and defense in the EU (Gotkowska 2017). According to Lieutenant General Frank Leidenberger, the decision to notify
PESCO is “a significant step in the right direction[...] because it offers good examples of how to effectively combine forces and strengthen defense skills” (PESCO: Schritt in die richtige Richtung 2018).

After the December 2017 EU Summit, at which PESCO was formally established, German Foreign Affairs Minister Sigmar Gabriel called this agreement a milestone. He also stated: “We have known for years that purely state-owned investments are no longer worthwhile”, and tax billions spent on defense are being thrown away, because they cannot meet the demands of a dramatically changing security environment. From now, “funds for security and defense can be used more efficiently”. Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, on this occasion spoke about a great day for Europe: “We are establishing a European Union of Security and Defense [...]. No country can solve for us the problems that Europe has in its neighborhood in the area of security, we ourselves must do it as Europeans” (Gemeinsam staerker 2018).

On November 19, 2018, a meeting of EU defense and foreign ministers of the EU on the global security strategy of the European Union took place in Brussels. During the meeting, the EU Foreign Affairs Council decided to begin 17 new PESCO projects, thus their number increased to 34. Ministers also discussed the rules for third countries’ participation in these projects. Ursula von Leyen said: ‘These are steps towards creating an army of Europeans’ (EU–Staaten... 2018). Currently, the Federal Republic of Germany participates within PESCO in 12 programmes (see Table 2).

Table 2. PESCO projects with Germany’s participation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Original name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC)</td>
<td>The EU TMCC is aimed to improve the accessibility, interoperability, specific skills and professionalism of the staff (trainers) for EU training missions in participating Member States.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)</td>
<td>The core of EUFOR CROC will improve EU crisis management capabilities by increasing the preparedness of EU forces and Member States to act and engage in operations and missions. It should gradually fill the gap between EU battle groups and serve the EU’s global strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – MALE RPAS (Eurodrone)</td>
<td>The goal is to jointly use the system in dedicated areas (e.g. operational testing and evaluation, logistics, training, exercises) of the newly developed, functional, inexpensive and sovereign European military capability for the next generation of MALE RPAS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III</td>
<td>The goal of this project is to significantly improve the overall performance of the TIGER helicopter by improving its detection, attack and connectivity capabilities, which will lead to the development of a modernised, innovative European attack helicopter.</td>
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5. **European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR)***

The ESSOR aims to develop common technologies for European military radio stations. Adopting these technologies as a standard will guarantee the interoperability of EU forces in joint operations, regardless of which radio platforms will be used, and strengthen European strategic autonomy. The project will create a secure military communication system.

6. **Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations***

The aim of the project is to improve the command and control systems for the EU missions and operations at the strategic level. It will streamline military decision-making, planning and carrying out of the missions, and coordinate EU forces. The strategic command and control system (C2) for CSDP missions will provide information systems and tools to support decision making. The integration of IT systems would include intelligence, command and control, and logistics systems.

7. **Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Programme for Future Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Cooperation***

The goal of the project is to establish a joint working group on electronic warfare. This is to enable operation in an electromagnetic environment and support EU battle groups through unique electronic warfare capabilities.

8. **European Medical Command (EMC)***

The EMC will provide the EU with sustainable medical capabilities to support field missions and operations. The project will contribute to progress in the interoperability and coherence of the healthcare potential in Europe (standardisation of concepts, training and certification).

9. **Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations***

The Network is aimed to improve strategic support. It is expected to improve logistics planning and movement, as well as to provide common standards and procedures that will significantly improve the ability of the EU and NATO to carry out even the most complicated missions.

10. **Military Mobility***

The project supports the commitment of Member States to simplify and standardise cross-border military transport procedures. It aims to accelerate the movement of military forces across Europe and guarantee the free movement of military personnel and assets within the EU.

11. **Co-basing***

The project aims to improve the exchange of bases and support points served by Member States both in Europe and abroad.

12. **Geo-meteorological and Oceanographic (GeoMETOC) Support Coordination Element (GMSCE)***

The goal of this project is to improve geo-meteorological and oceanographic (GeoMETOC) support for missions and operations through coordinating data acquisition and joint purchase of hardware and software.

*Source: own study based on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) updated list of PESCO projects – Overview – 19 November 2018.*
PESCO is an intergovernmental initiative of European Union countries. Germany has been actively involved in its cooperation, which may improve the EU’s capacity for action. They also co-created a new type of structural cooperation concept, thanks to which it will be possible to achieve ambitious goals in a smaller group. From now, groups of Member States can connect and implement joint projects, saving costs and using their potential to each other.

**e). The concept of the European intervention initiative**

European Intervention Initiative (EI²) is a concept of the French vision of European strategic autonomy outside the EU framework. Its goal is to create a coalition responding to crises around the borders of the European Union without the participation of NATO or the United States. It is about the sense of responsibility of European countries for the southern neighborhood of Europe and the ability to independent conducting the mission outside its own territory. The initiative would be a forum for cooperation of interested states outside the EU structures, which, according to French President Emmanuel Macron, would make it possible to make decisions quickly and efficiently. On 25 June 2018, from the France’s initiative, the Letter of Intent launching EI² (EI²) was signed by 9 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

The French proposal does not imply the creation of joint multinational European forces. The EI² countries have committed to: regular political and military consultations to identify potential security crises in the EU’s neighborhood (especially southern neighborhood); joint planning for the most likely crises; develop common doctrines and cooperation in the operations outside Europe. It is also intended not to duplicate NATO’s military structures and undermine cooperation in the EU. The EI² is a structure developed outside EU and NATO, but it can be compatible with them and, thus, can be used by both of them, if it is needed (Janoś 2018: p. 2).

France’s proposal to create a European intervention force caused a wide discussion in some EU countries. There were questions arose: who would authorise the use of force, what role would the United Nations play, how would intervention forces be financed? (Dempsey 2018). At the beginning, Germany was also critical towards the EI². There were several reasons for this. The details of the initiative remained unclear, and French information policy in this regard was unsatisfactory. The choice of formation outside the EU structures was also criticised. Although, the French analysis of the operational gaps was shared, they insisted on finding solutions in the EU institutions and in as many countries as possible. From the German point of view, building a parallel structure outside the EU always means weakening of the Union (Major, Mölling 2018a: p.4). This could undermine cooperation under the PESCO mechanism. Despite the existing fears, Germany decided to support the EI². Chancellor Angela Merkel, during her interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in early June 2018, said: “I support President Macron’s proposal for the intervention initiative.” However, she added: “such intervention forces with a common military-strategic culture must fit into the structure
of defense cooperation. European defense cooperation is very important” (Europa muss... 2018). The political costs of Germany’s rejection of the European Intervention Initiative would be too high. The EI2 was not a simple French initiative, but a project personally supported by the President Macron, prepared at a high political level. The opposition of the government would not stop French plans, but only delay them. This would complicate bilateral relations. By participating in this initiative, Germany is gaining a greater impact on its development.

**Transnational concept**

German military concepts have evolved from military intergovernmental cooperation outside the EU institutional and legal system towards transnational concepts\(^1\) located in the EU institutional and legal system, which proves not only a significant change of the priorities, but also the desire to deepen the integration process under CSDP through creation of transnational forms of military cooperation.

**a). The concept of the European army**

The vision of the European army as the final expression of the strategic autonomy of the European Union in security matters, despite the recently intensified cooperation in the field of security, remains a distant perspective. Nevertheless, the discussion about the degree of the strategic autonomy of the EU (to what extent the EU should develop, independent of individual Member States and international allies, its own security guarantees for its citizens) is increasing. This fact was noticeable in German public discussion.

At the first glance, the need for the EU strategic military autonomy seems to run in contradiction to the growing nationalism and promises of wider national autonomy observed in many Member States. Along with the increase in expenditure on modern weapon systems, social skepticism regarding military operations is also growing. As a result, the most of the EU members have recently reduced or even frozen military spendings. At the same time, however, national governments face complex security threats, ranging from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, piracy and energy security threats, and environmental protection, which for the most part of them are not limited to the specific countries or regions. In this context, cooperation at European level seems promising to many countries, as it would help reduce military spendings throughout the joint projects, and, at the same time, strengthen political and military power by joining forces from 27 Member States.

Already in March 2013, the chairman of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag Peer Steinbrück called the creation of the European army. During the organised by him symposium on the challenges of a common European security architecture, he said:

\(^1\) by the transnational cooperation the author understands the form of exchange between participating entities (e.g. states, military units, regions), which takes place outside and above countries (over nations), using common institutions (in this case EU institutions with the appropriate competences).
“EU countries should, according to their capabilities, take over important tasks in the European army in accordance with the principle of joining and sharing” (Kühne 2013). This will make it possible to compensate for the shortages in the armies of the Member States. According to Steinbrück, a quarter of the German navy is missing, and specialists and directors lack 40% of staff. It is logical to think only about a joint EU army. The European army would be a remedy for the shortage of personnel and military equipment.

Discussion on this subject became more intensive after Russian annexy of Crimea. The President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in an interview for Welt am Sonntag called for the creation of a European army: “Such an army would help us shape the common foreign and security policy and jointly bear the responsibility of Europe in the world” (Balzli et al. 2015). Thanks to its own army, Europe will be able to reliably respond to the threat to peace in a Member State or countries neighboring the EU. According to Juncker, this may give the Russians the impression that “we are serious about defending the values of the European Union” (Balzli et al. 2015). In response to the harsh situation in Eastern Ukraine and Juncker’s interview, Chancellor Angela Merkel also supported (while quite cautiously) the creation of a European army. According to Christiane Wirtz, the government spokesperson, Merkel welcomed the votes in favor of its creation, saying that there should be “enhanced military cooperation in Europe”, but at the same time she stressed that this is a “project of the future” that cannot be included in a specific schedule (Kanzlerin Merkel… 2015). Of course, such an army would not be competition for NATO, but its complementation. The German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen also responded to the Juncker’s proposal that in the near future the EU needs a European army.

Until now, however, it has not been openly discussed on what level of strategic autonomy the EU should decide. The position of states could be reduced to the thesis that one should maintain their autonomy with some cooperation at European level. The initiated PESCO initiative may actually lead to wider strategic autonomy. The extent to which this potential will be implemented remains to be seen. Despite some caution, the announcement of work on the future European army can be found in the coalition agreement concluded at the beginning of 2018 between the CDU/CSU (germ. Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich-Soziale Union) and the SPD (germ.: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). The coalition members forming the new government said, that they wanted to act for defense. Planning processes in the EU should be coordinated in a more effective way and harmonised with NATO processes. The government has pledged to take steps to create an “army of Europeans” (Ein neuer Aufbruch… 2018: p.17, 146). The discussion about the own European army took on a new dimension in autumn 2018. On 6 November 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron gave an interview to the radio station Europe 1. He again called for the creation of a European army. He pointed to the rising era of totalitarianism in Europe and nationalist movements that demand closed borders and frighten citizens. But Europeans should be aware of who
they are and how they live: “peace and prosperity, in which Europe lived for 70 years, is a golden breakthrough in our history.” Macron took up the subject of the European armed forces: “We will not be able to protect Europeans unless we decide to have a real European army. In the face of Russia, which is at our borders and has shown that it can be dangerous (...), we must have a Europe that defends itself - not only depending on the United States, but also in a more sovereign way” (Exclusif..., 2018). How would the European army look like? Specific solutions have not yet been presented, but according to the France, the first step towards a common European army would be the creation of intervention troops ready to act in the situations of a crisis, e.g. in Africa. This army would be based on a group of several countries. It was only at the next stage that a full-fledged European army would be created (Strasbourg: Merkel za “prawdziwą” europejską armią 2018). On November 11, 2018, during the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, the French president has explicitly called for the creation of a European army. His initiative met with mixed feelings in Germany. Although defense cooperation is often declared by the German government, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen did not directly support the proposal of the French president. She proposed closer military cooperation within the EU, but not as part of a real European army. For Leyen, the army of Europeans (germ.: eine Armee der Europäer) is a more realistic goal, not the European army (germ.: europäische Armee). The minister said: “every armed forces have their own peculiarities, their identity, this is also important for their own image and action” (Macron will..., 2018). She also advocated further deepening of existing forms. Soldiers work together, but are still subject to nation states, not the EU. In Leyen’s view, responsibility for missions must remain national.

Chancellor Angela Merkel took a different position on this issue. She supported Emanuel Macron’s proposal to create a European army. At the European Parliament in Strasbourg, she said: “Europe should work on the vision of creating a real European army’ (Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel 2018). She explained that a joint European army would show the world that there would never be a war between European countries. She emphasised, however, that such an army would be a supplement, not an alternative to NATO. The current connections should not be questioned, but cooperation within a joint army would be easier. Merkel added: “If we have more than 160 defense or weapon systems today, and the United States of America only 50 or 60, if we need separate administration, support and training for everything, then we are not an effective partner.” In her opinion, Europe should also create a common policy on arms exports (Rede..., 2018). It was about how to ensure the future for the European defense industry. France and Germany account for around 40 percent of the total defense industry in Europe (their combined sales value is USD 29,540 billion) (Fleureant et al. 2018: p.9–10). Germany sells weapons for over USD 8 billion a year (see Table 3). This is a huge potential, thanks to which Europe could gain strategic autonomy in the field of industry. Agreed Franco-German procurement projects can be a catalyst for European projects and the innovative and competitive defense industry in Europe (Major, Mölling 2018b).
Table 3. The largest German defense companies (data as of 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place in the world in terms of sales weapons</th>
<th>Company name</th>
<th>Arms sales (in USD million)</th>
<th>Total sales (in USD million)</th>
<th>Sales ratio utilities for total sale (in%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rheinmetall</td>
<td>3 420</td>
<td>6 644</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>ThyssenKrupp</td>
<td>1 920</td>
<td>46 704</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Krauss-Maffei Wegmann</td>
<td>1 750</td>
<td>1 803</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Hensoldt</td>
<td>1 160</td>
<td>1 217</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The government coalition does not agree how to refer to Macron’s proposal. The Secretary General of the CDU, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is the chairwoman of the party as the successor of Angela Merkel, has a different opinion than Minister von der Leyen. She called the European army “significant”. Also SPD head Andrea Nahles supported Macron’s proposal for the European army. According to her, this will allow for more efficient operation, as there are currently 28 armies, 27 air forces and 23 navies in the EU.

Faced with a lack of resolution and discrepancy between statements of Defense Minister and Chancellor Merkel, an expert on Bundestag’s foreign policy from the CDU/CSU, Norbert Röttgen (CDU) claimed that the federal government would take a coordinated approach to defense policy. In an interview with the Handelsblatt newspaper, he said: “there is still no German idea on how to establish a common defense. Without a common military capability, a common European foreign policy will not be taken seriously” (Riedel 2018).

Already in 2011, the Bundeswehr’s colonel Gerd F. Kaldrack presented four steps that could lead to the creation of the European army. The EU should bravely, with the help of experts and under the leadership of the European Commission, create innovative and creative forms of cooperation, up to the development of new European integration structures, despite common thinking in terms of national sovereignty. The first step is to develop a concept of European civilian-military forces. It is about creating a complementary system of civilian-military forces of the EU and Member States and defining their goals, tasks, means, powers, structures and procedures. Step two is jointly development of the concept of a European training network. The Europeanisation of education would have enormous advantages: economy and efficiency gains, while no nation state would lose sovereignty by cooperating at supranational-national level and focusing on education. Step three is the permanent structured cooperation and expansion of the EU battle groups – the cooperation of national commands, state institutions and troops, and the establishment of the first European civil-military forces. Combining the skills of European nations will open new perspectives for the EU. And finally, the fourth and final step: the creation of a European army in the form of integrated EU civil-military forces and developed state structures of the armed forces of the Member States, in accordance with the strategy for the implementation of the CSDP.
The establishment of fully integrated civilian-military security forces and armed forces at European level and forces in nation-states seems to be the best project. Such an army, as a potential intervention force at the European level, would have a whole spectrum of tools for action and at the same time would force the optimisation of the national forces functioning. This would allow us to preserve our combat capabilities at a global level. It also means stronger Europeanisation of national security and the defense industry. An integrated defense and armaments market would be an important signal not only for Europe but also for the US and NATO, that the European Union is serious about improving its defense technology and industrial base, as well as developing military capabilities and instruments and security (Kaldrack 2011: p. 60–61).

The implementation of the idea of creating a European army is in its initial phase. Angela Merkel’s government is in favor of its creation, but there are no specific dates or proposals regarding the structure, tasks, and timetable for its creation. There is also no name for this possible military formation, there are several concepts: the Army of Europeans (germ.: Armee der Europäer), the European Army (germ.: Europäische Armee), the Common European Army (germ.: Gemeinsame Europäische Armee) or the European Union Army (germ.: EU-Armee).

Despite the fact that title has not yet been created, the Germany see the need for a supranational European army with a joint command, so they will have to convince the other Member States along with the French in this idea. Recognising that they are responsible for strengthening of solidarity and cohesion in the European Union, France and Germany must recognise that Member States differ in their level of ambition when it comes to the project of European integration, including military integration.

**Conclusions**

Specific conclusions follow from Germany’s involvement in military integration within the European Union. The Federal Republic of Germany has set European responsibility for peace as its primary goal. The country wants to be an increasingly active actor and to adapt its internal resources to these aspirations. Germany can, therefore, become a “peace defender” and participate in interventions outside the country. The country creates or co-creates (the most often with France) the order of Europe, which is guaranteed by economic, political and military integration. Thanks to the EU, German foreign policy began to reach into Asia, the Americas and Africa. Events in the immediate vicinity of the European Union, such as the war in Syria, the unstable situation in northern Africa or the accession of Crimea by Russia and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, a change in the tone of foreign policy of the US President Donald Trump, push Germany to support stronger military integration of the European Union. There are two paths of the military concept development.

The first one is the evolution of this concept from intergovernmental military cooperation to transnational cooperation, and the second one is from cooperation outside the institutional and legal system to cooperation in the EU institutional and legal
system. The concepts co-created or co-implemented by Germany assume, however, that a strong and united Europe can fight off external threats if it develops its own military component. Conceptual asymmetry is clearly visible, and it is characterised by the fact, that intergovernmental concepts are easier to present and implement, do not require treaty sanctions, that is why there are more (military missions, PESCO, strengthened CSDP, El2) than transnational concepts, from which only one can be properly extracted, i.e. the concept of the European army. Of course, the German government does not diminish NATO’s defensive significance, especially in the face of the uncertain international environment, underinvestment and the modest personal status of the Bundeswehr. A possible European army would mean that instead of American soldiers, EU soldiers would then ensure the sovereignty of the European Union (Schrock 2015). Many legal issues related to the operations of such army outside Germany should also be resolved. The debate on legal evaluation would be interesting. Certainly, the legal basis for the functioning of the future European army should be the treaties, it should be through changes in the Lisbon Treaty or the signing of another treaty, e.g. the European Defense Treaty. The Basic Law would also have to be amended. Steps towards the future European Defense Community have already been made, initiatives such as PESCO can bring the creation of the European army closer. The evolution of German concepts may also be influenced by the integral federalism, which this country adheres to, which it implemented after the Second World War into the political and administrative system, i.e. a system based on multilevelness and cooperation of authorities, which has proved itself, brings results, and, therefore, can also bring effects in multilevel military cooperation in the EU.

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